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Standard Pecan Co., 309 Ill. 226, 140 N.E. 834 (1923), the court, reversing a
judgment for the plaintiff purchaser, founded its reasoning upon the argument
that the agent, making the repurchase agreement, was only a special agent having power to sell the stock, but was unauthorized to do more, and so far as the
principal was concerned the sale was not conditional, and the court felt that
retaining the purchase money was not a ratification of the agent's unauthorized
agreement.
In comparing these three cases with the instant case it becomes evident that
each case is characterized not only by its facts but by the reasoning used by
the courts in each to reach what they feel is the equitable decision. The courts
which found for the plaintiff purchaser seemingly were influenced by facts
which were not "legally" important to the problem at hand. In the instant case
the advanced age of the plaintiff's was a motivating factor in the court's decision,
and in the two cases in which the repurchase agreement was made with the
plaintiff by important officers of the defendant corporation the court took this
point into consideration and decided that the plaintiff was entitled to recover
what he had paid for stock in the defendant corporation. The "argumentative
tools" used by the courts in all of the cases are varied, and this variance in the
use of these tools, such as "special agent," "unjust enrichment," and "ratification,"
brings forth the point that the courts will decide where the equities lie and will
then bolster the decision through the use of the "standardized" legal terminology.
It should be noted that in the case where the court reached its decision through
the strictest adherence to the usual legal arguments the resulting decision is in
the minority.
JosEpi GOLDnERG AND JOHN H. RussELL.
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS-LABILITY OP SuRETY.-

This action is by a subcontractor upon a statutory bond intended to affard protection to materialmen and laborers who furnished materials or performed labor
in the construction of a public building. The plaintiff sued the surety on the
bond, the contractor, and its receiver to recover for services performed on
school "No. 69." He had also done work for the same contractor on school
"No. 49." The bond for that job was underwritten by another surety. It was
contended by the defendant that the plaintiff had received money in payment
for the work done on school "No. 69," and had wrongfully applied the money
so received upon the payment of the prior account. The trial court entered a
judgment on the verdict in the amount of $1,692.33 which was the amount
determined to be still due and owing upon job "No. 69." On appeal, held, judgment affirmed. In the event of failure by debtor to designate, the creditor has the
right to apply payments received to whatever debt he may choose. The finding
of the jury that no direction was made by the debtor, is binding in absence
of evidence grossly to the contrary. Western & Southern Indemnity Co. v.
Cramer, (Ind. 1937) 10 N.E. (2d) 440.
The general rule is that where a debtor owes distinct accounts or debts and
makes a voluntary payment of money, he may direct its application. Upon his
failure to so designate the creditor may, and in the absence of either party to so
designate, the law will apply it justly, usually in extinguishment of the first
debt. Born v. Union Elevator Co., 67 Ind. App. 97, 118 N.E. 973 (1918); Stone
v. Talbot, 4 Wis. 422 (1855) ; Milwaukee Boston Store v. Katz, 153 Wis. 492,
140 N.W. 1038 (1913). Unless an agreement exists to the contrary payments in
absence of designation must be applied to extinguishment of the indebtedness
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first accrued. Yellow River Improvement Co. v. Arnold, 46 Wis. 214, 4 N.W.
971 (1879) ; Hannarv. Engehnann, 49 Wis. 278, 5 N.W. 791 (1880). A mortgagor
paying interest has the right to indicate on which of several mortgages payment
should be applied. Johnson v. Bank of New Richmond, 188 Wis. 620, 206 N.W.
871 (1926). The law governing the application of payments is the same whether
the payments are made on an ordinary running mercantile account, or on an
account made up of as many independent causes of action as there are bills of
goods sold. American Wollen Co. v. Maaget, 86 Conn. 234, 85 At. 583 (1912).
Application to one of two accounts is determined by the intention of the parties.
Paragould & M. R. Co- v. Smith,. 193 Ark. 224, 124 S.W. 776 (1910). But
neither debtor nor creditor can claim the right to appropriate a payment to a
particular item of an account after a controversy has arisen. Lehigh Coal &
Navigation Co. v. McLeod, 114 Me. 427, 96 Atl. 736 (1916). Under all ordinary
circumstances the debtor and creditor may control the application of payments
between themselves as between secured and unsecured indebtedness. F. A.
Patrick & Co. v. Deschamp, 145 Wis. 224, 129 N.W. 1096 (1911).
The courts are fairly consistent in their application of the broad and general
doctrine where there is no accommodating party in the case who would be
prejudiced by the application to one account or to another. Where an accommodating party is involved the courts hold diverse views. Some courts are of the
opinion that it is necessary for the materialnan-creditor to determine the source
of the money which he receives from the contractor and in the event of his
failure to do so, and if by reason of misapplication he fails to file a lien, he
is precluded from recovery. Sipes v. Ardman Book & News Co., 138 Okla. 180,
280 Pac. 805 (1929); The United States, for Crane Co. v. Johnson, Saathers
& Rallins, 67 F. (2d) 121 (C.C.A. 4th, 1933). It has been held that a materialman who receives from the contractor with full knowledge that it was turned
over for purpose of payment of a specific debt cannot apply it to the payment of
another debt. Farrv. Weaver, 84 W.Va. 182, 99 S.E. 395 (1919) ; Owell Banking
Co. v. Pelton, 34 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 172, 106 N.E. 1071 (1911). The surety is entitled
to benefit of a payment made by the principal with money furnished for that
purpose by the builder where the creditor knows the circumstances and the
source of the payment, although the principal assented to its application to
another debt. Bayer v. Leyor, 186 N.Y. 569, 79 N.E. 1100 (1906). The opposite
view is taken in the case of Standard Oil Co. v. Day, 161 Minn. 281, 201 N.W.
410 (1924), where it was held that the payment of money to the contractor by the
principal imposed upon the contractor no obligations as regards the surety; payment and application in any manner whatsoever could not be controlled or
regulated by the surety. In Salt Lake City v. O'Conner, 68 Utah 238, 249 Pac.
810, 49 A.L.R. 941 (1926), the court said that it was for the public interest that
commercial transactions should not be fettered, that complications should not be
increased, and that money once released should circulate freely unbranded by
any hidden equities of the law. The Wisconsin court has held that where a
debtor makes a voluntary payment to a creditor who has several claims against
him and fails to direct where such payment shall be applied, the creditor has a
right to apply the same on any of the claims, which rule governs a payment
made by a contractor to a materialman who had furnished materials to him on
several different jobs as against a property owner from whom the contractor
had received the money so paid. W. H. Pipkorn Co. v. Evangelical Lutheran St.
Jacobi Society of the City of Milwaukee, 144 Wis. 501, 129 N.W. 516 (1911).
It is submitted that the idea of commercial necessity is plausible. The usual
dealings between materialmen and contractor involve the handling of various
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commodities for more than one job on which the contractor is working at the
same time. For reasons of convenience the contractor does not have several
bank accounts, but rather one running account and the burden which some courts
would put on the materialman to determine the source of the payment and apply
it to its separate account would affect adversely the course of modem business
transactions. The courts suggest that surety companies should insist that contractors get waivers of liens from materialmen and that the contractors should
have to turn these over to the builder, the city or private company, to qualify
for the progress payments.
KEARNEY W. HEMP.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DEPENDENTS-ADULT WHO HAD BEEN SUPPORTED
BY DECEASED

STEPFATHER

ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION.-This

is a proceeding

brough by one Frances Lindsay, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, for
the death of her stepfather. The applicant, Frances Lindsay, resided with the
deceased pursuant to an agreement whereby the applicant provided a home and
paid the taxes thereon out of her own funds, while her deceased stepfather paid
the current household expenses. The Industrial Commission, later affirmed by
the circuit court, ordered the payment of compensation to the applicant as a
dependent of the deceased employee. On appeal, held, judgment reversed on the
grounds that the computation of the amount of compensation was imperfect,
though the applicant, as a dependent of the deceased, was eligible for some compensation. Duluth-Superior Milling Co. v. The Industrial Commission, (Wis.
1937) 275 N.W. 515.
A dependent is one who is sustained by, or relies for support on, the aid of
another, or who looks in some way to another for some of the reasonable necessities of life consistent with his or her social position, and who does so with
some reasonable expectation of future support. Koeppel v. E. L Dit Pont de
Nemours Co., (Del. 1936) 183 Atl. 516. The issue of dependency, unless
the Workman's Compensation Act specifically sets forth who shall be presumed to be a dependent, is a question of fact to be determined in accordance with the facts as they existed at the time of the accident. Morrison
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 212 Wis. 507, 250 N.W. 396 (1933). Section 102.51 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides that there shall be a conclusive presumption that a wife is dependent upon her husband with whom
she was living at the time of his death, that a husband is dependent upon a
wife with whom he was living at the time of her death, a child under 18
dependent upon the parent with whom it was living, and a child over such age,
but mentally or physically incapacitated, upon the parent with whom such child
was living at the time of the parent's death. In the absence of such a statute
there are no presumptions of dependency regardless of the relations of the
parties. Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comitission, 67 Utah 25, 245 Pac. 381, 45
A.L.R. 882 (1926). The courts will not, on their own initiative, infer any presumption that aged parents are dependent upon their adult child with whom they
reside. Wisconsin Mutual Liability Co. v. Industrial Commission, 184 Wis. 203,
199 N,.W. 221 (1924); Wisconsin Drainage Co. v. Industrial Commission, 161
Wis. 42, 152 N.W. 460 (1915). Nor will the courts raise any presumption that
grandchildren are dependent upon the grandparents with whom they reside,
where the statute provides only for the dependence of a minor child upon its
parents. Universal Foundry Co. v. Industrial Commission, (Wis. 1937) 272 N.W.
23. That case, however, held that an adopted child taken in and supported by the

